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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
PACIFIC METALS COMPANY, DIVISION
OF A.M. CASTLE & COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
and Cross-Appellant,
vs.
TRACY-COLLINS BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Third-Party
Plaintiff, and Appellant,
and
BANK OF SALT LAKE,
Defendant and Cross-Plaintiff,
and Cross-Respondent,
vs.
TRACY-COLLINS BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Third-Party
Plaintiff, and Appellant,
vs.
OLYMPUS HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING, a corporation,
Third-Party Defendant.

Case No.
11083

Brief of Respondent and Cross-Appellant
NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an action by plaintiff, Pacific Metals
Company, Division of A. M. Castle and Company,
against defendants Tracy-Collins Bank and Trust
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Company and Bank of Salt Lake to recover the prir 1•
cipal amount of $5.321.70, plus interest and costs 011
a joint payee check deposited by Olympus Hea.tinCJ
and Air Conditioning, a third-party defendant, without the endorsement of the plaintiff.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge of ths
District Court of Salt Lake County, granted a Summary Judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant Tracy-Collins for a conversion of the
check in the sum of $.S,978.41 interest and costs, de
nied the defendant Tra_cy-Collins' Motion for Summary Judgment against the plaintiff, denied the
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment again:.;!
the defendant Bank of Salt Lake and granted the
Bank of Salt Lake's Motion for Summary Judgment
against Tracy-Collins and the plaintiff no cause of
action. (R. l l 3-114, 143-144)
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff seeks an affirmation of its Summary Judgment against Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust
Company and a reversal of the Judgment denyinq
the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment against
the Bank of Salt Lake and a reversal of the Judgrnent
granting Bank of Sult Lake's Motion for Summar\'
Judgment against the plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As stated, the Appellant's "Statement of Facts'
is deficient and misleading in that it omits certain
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necessary and important facts, misstates other facts
and assumes as facts matters not supported by the
record, giving its "Statement of Facts" the effect oi
un argument.
Except, however, as supplemented and corrected below. the respondent agrees with the Statement of Facts set forth by the appellant.
The respondent asserts that the following language in the first unnumbered paragraph on page
6 of the Appellant's Brief, ", ... Olympus as its owner and the owner of the funds represented by it,
... ", is a conclusion unsupported by reference to
the record and in fact unsupported by the record.
The respondent asserts that the second unnumbered paragraph on page 6 of the Appellant's
Brief misstates the facts and that the additional facts
set forth below fairly state the facts on record and
a.re not inconsistent with the portions of the record
referenced by appellant in support of that paragraph.
The following facts sho Jld be added to the
Statement:
1

The facts set forth in appellant's "Statement of
Nature of the Case" are adopted as a part of the
Statement of Facts in the case.
The question of payroll and overhead was not
discussed by Olympus and Pacific Metals when they
entered into their agreement for joint payee checks
from Mayne. (Stott depo. p. 41, Williams depo. pp. 7,
29 & 30)
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It was the intent of Olympus and Pacific Metals
through thls joint payee agreement to pay for purchases made for the East High School job and to
clear the past due indebtedness owing by Olympus
to Pacific Metals existing at the commencement of
the East High School job. (\!Villiams depo. pp. 7, 1\
& 16; Stott depo. pp. 4, 6-10 & 34)
At the time the check ]n question was issued
Pacific Metals and Olympus knew the job was about
completed. (Stott depo. p. 14; Wllliams depo. p. 24)
Olympus still owed Pacific Metals more than the
amount of the check in question, (R 48, 107; Stott
depo. pp. 47 & 48) and one hundred percent of all
amounts still remaining unpaid to Olympus on the
East High School job would be required to pay off
the indebtedness to Pacific Metals. (Stott depo. pp.
12, 13 & 14, R 107)
In addition, it was the agreement of Olympus
and Pacific Metals that the negotiation on each
check was to determine how much, if any, Olympus would be entitled to receive back from Pacific
Metals (Stott depo. pp. 11, 12, 16, 17, 24, 50, & 51;
Williams depo. pp. 5, 22, 24) and would be based on
the balance of the account with Pacific Metals. (Stott
depo p. 6) Further there was no specific agreement
to negotiate the check in question (Stott depo. pp. 11,
17; Williams depo. p. 24; R 48) and both Pacific
Metals and Olympus understood Pacific Metals was
entitled to the full amount of the check in question.
(Stott depo. p. 52; Williams depo. pp. 22 & 24, R 45
and 55) Finally, Olympus claims no interest in the
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check and acknowledges Pacific Metals right thereto. (Stott depo. pp. 24 & 52; R. 45) A subsequent check
for $3,071.70 was in fact endorsed by Olympus and
retained in full by the plaintiff. (R. 107)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF A MATERIAL FACT ON WHICH TRIAL IS REQUIRED.

There is not one statement in the record to the
effect that Olympus was the owner of the check in
question and solely entitled to the entire proceeds
therefrom. This is a "fact" implied into the case by
Appellant in the face of direct statements to the contrary and an obvious agreement to the contrary as
evidenced by the Statement of Facts as supplemented by R.espondent and Cross-Appellant. The
Appellant was forced to abbreviate greatly its Statement of Facts in order to throw a ray of credibility
on its implication.
This transaction involved a contract between
Mayne, Olympus and Pacific Metals, each receiving consideration and each agreeing to the arrangement. Mayne was to receive performance by Olympus on its contract. Olympus was to receive from
Pacific Metals the necessary materials to perform
its contract and Pacific Metals was to receive payment for a past indebtedness, as well as payment
for materials to be delivered on the job in question.
The parties involved in the contract do not disagree,
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but Appellant having erred in its handling of th:
check in question and having improperly payeJ
and processed the same, now attempts to save it:::
"chestnuts" by stirring up a fire of litigation between the parties to the contract who are in agreement. The law certa_inly should not look favorably
upon such third-party irn=;pired litigation.
Olympus and Pacific Metals requested Mayne
put both their names on the checks and thereafter
Olympus, on each occasion, with the exception ol
the check in question, attempted to obtain back
from Pacific Metals as much of the check as possible
to meet its current obligations. Both admit their in
tention to clear the indebtedness of Olympus to
Pacific Metals. Both admit the necessity of applying
all of the check in question, plus all future checks,
in order to accomplish that purpose and both admit
the entitlement of Pacific Metals to all of, the proceeds of the check in question.
The stated intentions and understandings of the
parties are of utmost importance in determining the
terms of an oral contract and thus, whether or not
there is a conflict in the facts. In Wiliston on Con·
tracts, third edition by Walter H. E. Jaeger, Baker
Voorhis and Company, Inc., 196 l, Vol. 4, Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, Section 605, at
pp. 789 and 790, it is stated:
"An important aid in the interpretation of contracts
is the practical construction placed on the agreement
by the parties themselves. The process of practi_cal
interpretation and application is a further indicat10n
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by the parties of the meaning which they have placed
upon the terms of the contract they have made.
Courts give great weight to these expressions, be
they acts or declarations."

The above quote cites as one of its authorities
the case of Scotch Mfg. Co. v. Carr, 53 Fla. 480, 43
S. 427, where it is stated:
"If it be true, even in the case of a written contract,
the terms of which are doubtful or ambiguous, that
the construction placed thereon by the parties themselves may be shown and shall govern, as the cited
cases hold, with how much more force does this principle apply to oral contracts? The principles of
technical nicety cannot be strictly applied in the
construction of these everyday oral contracts made
by plain businessmen in their course of trade and
traffic. To do so would frequently result in overthrowing the meaning and understanding of the
parties."

Thus, when Olympus admits Pacific Metals was
entitled to the full amount, Pacific Metals claims it
was entitled to the full amount, and subsequent to
the check in the question, an additional check issued by Mayne to Olympus is handled in precisely
the manner each asserts it should have been, the
agreement is clear a.nd the Appellant should not be
Permitted to attempt to save its own funds, placed
in jeopardy by its lack of -:ittention to its duties.
To embrace the construction which Appellant
attempts to set before this Court and which it attempts to support by is abbreviated Statement of
f ctcts, would leave without effect a practice common
in the construction industry, that of securing debts
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by joint payee checks. This practice has proved
most advantageous to our community and should be
stimulated rather than stifled. Such arrangements
should be given the effect intended by those who
enter into them, that of securing payment for the •
purchase of materials required for performance o!
the less powerful contractors. Such was certainly
the intent in this case. Both parties acknowledged
that intent. Both parties recognized the necessity o!
Pacific Metals retaining all of the proceeds of the
check in question in order to give effect to that intent.
1

The fact that Pacific Metals used discretion in
exercising its rights on previous checks, cannot in
retrospect be cast back as a stone by Tracy-Collins,
the originator of the present problem and the selfasserted discoverer of a dispute where none existed.
At the time this check was issued the job was
soon to be completed. More of Olympus' debt to
Pacific Metals remained unpaid than could be covered by all amounts still to be paid by Mayne to
Olympus on completion of the work. Pacific Metals
could no longer afford to be generous and the fact
that it had been in the past or that it might still have '
been, had Tracy-Collins not deprived it of its funds,
cannot in speculation be used by Tracy-Collins as
a glove to hide the stains on its own hands.
As pointed out in Young v. Felomia, 121 Utah
646, 244 P. 2d 862, cited by appellant on page 19
of its Brief. A Motion for Summary Judgment should
be denied "if there is any genuine issue as to any
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material fact, ... " This does not apply to manufactured issues or issues which may exist, but which
are immaterial to the decision. Even if, as Appellant attempts to persuade this Court, certain issues
are somewhat less than crystal, what happened in
the past as to previous checks would not be determinative as to what was to happen on the check
in question where the agreement is obviously to the
contrary.
Thus, it is the position of the Respondent that
if any issues do remain which would require a jury
of reasonable men to resolve, those issues are not
ma_terial to a decision in this case, and so would not
require an overtllrning of the Court's decision below. Abdulkadir v. Westem Pacific Railroad Company, 7 U. 2d 53, 318 P.2d 339 (1957).
POINT II
THE ARGUMENTS EXPOUNDED BY APPELLANT AS TO ASSIGNMENT OF FUNDS BY A
CHECK HAVE NO APPLICATION TO THE
CASE NOW BEFORE THIS COURT.

The Appellant's argument relating to the question of assignment and the cases cited in support
of that argument are not in point and do not apply
in any way to the facts of this case. The argument
and the cases cited relate to the premise that c
check does not serve as an assignment by the
maker to the payee of his funds in the drawee bank.
There is no such question before the Court. Here
we are concerned with an oral agreement, wherein
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the maker agreed to put both Olympus' and Pacific
Metals' names on the check (which it did witho;Jf
default) and wherein Olympus and Pacific Metals
agreed the present purchases would be secured
and the past debt paid off in return for Pacific:
Metals providing materials required. The materials
were provided, but the debts were not paid off as
agreed because of Appellant's improper processing
of the check in question.
The further statement by Appellant that there
was no wr ltten assignment by Olympus to Pacific
Metals does not neqate the actual agreement testified to by the parties and their instruction to Mayne
to make the checks payable jointly, which had the
effect of an assignment and which created obligations in Mayne Plumbing which Pacific Metals had
the right to enforce if Mayne, after accepting and
agreeing to the arrangement, failed to perform
under it.
POINT III
THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER
FROM TRACY-COLLINS THE FULL AMOUNT
OF THE PROCEEDS FROM THE CHECK IN
QUESTION.

Respondent has been unable to locate through
extensive research any Utah cases which deal with
the exact question of liability of a cashing and paying bank to a joint payee of a check cashed without
the endorsement of one of the payees. There is,
however. certain statutory and other authority in
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the State of Utah which would compel the conciusion that such banks are so liable and there are
ample annotations and cases from other jurisdictions to support that conclusion.
Section 44-1-42, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as

cm0nded in effect at the time of this transaction,

stiltes:

"Where an instrument is payable to the order of two
or more payees or endorsees who are not partners,
all must endorse unless the one endorsing has authority to endorse for the other."

Also, Section 44-1-24, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended, likewise in effect at the time of this
transaction, reads as follows:
"Where a signature is forged, or made without
authority of the person whose signature it purports
to be, it is wholely inoperative, and no right to retain
the instrument, or to give a discharge thereof or to
enforce payment thereof against any party thereto,
can be acquired through or under said signature,
unless the party against whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting up the
forri;ery or want of authority."

This Court in the case of Simpson vs Denver

R.G.R. Co., 43 Utah 105, 110, 134 Pac. 883, has indi-

c:ated even in absence of the aforequoted section
that a forged endorsement does not pass title to
commercial paper negotiable only by endorsement.
The Simpson Case and the above quoted statutes
are compelling authority in the case presently before the court.
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I

These Utah authorities are even more cornpelling in view of statements from other jurisdic- \
tions to the effect that:
1

"We regard the absence of an endorsement by the
holder as serious if not more so as a forged endorsement. One is easily discernable; the other is the result of an error in the identification of the payee.
If, as has been said, it is the duty of the bank cashing the check to know to a positive certainty the
identity of the payee named therein, and its failure
so to do imposes a duty of reimbursing the drawee, ,
it seems clear to us that failure to secure the endorsement of all of the payees imposes an even
greater duty on the holder."

American National Bank of Denver v. First National
Bank of Denver, 277 P. 2d 951, 130 Colo. 557 (!954), ,
and again in almost identical language it is stated
in United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company v.
People's National Bank. 24 Ill. App. 2d 275, 164 N.E.
2d 497 (1960):
"The absence of an endorsement by the holder is,
in our view, more serious than a forged endorsement
for the reason that the former is easily discemable
while the latter is the result of an error in the
identification of the payee. If, as it has been said,
it is the duty of the cashing bank to know to a
positive certainty the identification of the payee or
the payees named therein and its failure so to do
imposes a duty of reimbursing the drawee, it seems
abundantly clear that the failure to secure the endorsement of all the payees imposes an even greater
duty on the cashing bank."

Section 44-1-42 above quoted is identical to Section 41 of the N.I.L. which is annotated in 5, Uniform

i

~
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Laws Annotated, Section 41. It is there stated:
"The endorsement of all payees is necessary to give
good title to a transferee. (Citation omitted) This
makes any transferee, especially including the cashing bank, who takes without a valid endorsement of
all payees, a converter of the instrument because he
receives no title thereto. ( e.a.)

In 38 A.LR., 799, discussing liability on joint
payee paper without the endorsement of other
payees thereon, it is stated:
"A bank which has cashed a check payable to two
persons, upon the unauthorized endorsement of one
of them of the whole instrument, is liable to the
other payee in the absence of ratification by him of
the act of his co-payee."

The annotation cites as authority the case of
Allan v. Com Exchange Bank, 87 App. Div. 335, 84
N.Y. S. 1001, (1903), which is a missing endorsement
case. That case held that the endorsement of one of
two joint payees was insufficient to pass to the Corn
Exchange Bank the interest of the plaintiff in the
money represented by the check.
In the Colorado case of American National Bank
of Denver vs First National Bank of Denver, supra at
page 12, which interpreted a statute similar to our
own, the court stated:
"Under the common law as well as by our 'Negotiable
Instruments Law', where one of the payees fails to
endorse, the negotiability of the check is completely
destroyed, (Citation omitted)."
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And at p. 956 it states:
"At best, Herford [the cashing bank], was entitled

to retain only the financial interest that Frontier
Motor Co. had in the check in question."

Frontier was the payee who actually deposited the
check without the endorsement of the joint payee.
The Court further states:
"It ... is a recognized rule of law that any bank or '
person cashing a drawer's check does so at its or his
peril, being obligated to pay the same only upon
the genuine endorsement of the payees named therein."

In the case of Dawson & White vs National Bank
of Greenville, 197, N.C. 499, 150 S.E. 38 (1929), the
court stated:
"Where a check is payable to two or more persons
as payees or to their order, the amount of the check
must be paid to both payees or upon the order of
both. Payment to one of the payees or to the order
of one of the payees without the authority of the
other payee does not discharge the drawee bank of
its liability for the amount of the check, unless the
payees are partners.

In the case here before the court, there is, of course,
no question as to partnership-there was none.
A most compelling authority in support of the
plaintiff's right to recover herein is the case ol
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company vs
People's National Bank, supra at page 12. In that
case the court was interpreting a statute identical

!
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to our own in a situation where an insurance company made a check payable jointly to the insured
"J.nd to the party who repaired the insured' s dam0ged machinery. The insured cashed the check
with only his endorsement and spent his money.
The insurance company was both the drawer and
the drawee. The insurance company, asknowledgmg its liability to the damaged payee, paid the
damaged payee the amount of the check and then
sued the bank which cashed the check without the
endorsement of the damaged payee to recover back
its losses. The court holding in favor of the insurance company against the cashing bank states:
"Al though decisions involving so called 'missing endorsements' are few and although no reviewing court
in Illinois has considered such a case, the Illinois
decisions involving forged endorsements and other
irregular endorsements provide settled authority to
rule that one called upon to act upon the faith of a
written instrument, including an endorsement of
commercial paper, must ascertain its genuineness at
its peril. The principle rests in public policy and has
been universally considered necessary for the security of commercial transactions."

The Court then goes on to express its position
quoted at page 12 above, that the cashing of a check
with a missing endorsement is a more serious error
on the part of the cashing bank than the cashing of
a check with a forged endorsement. The court concluded:
"Finally, it is our conclusion that the rule is that
a drawer-drawee and a damaged payee each has a
cause of action against a cashing bank for damages
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sustained where the cashing bank failed to obtain
the endorsement of all co-payees on a check or draft.
Gustin-Bacon Mfg. Co. v. First National Bank, 306
Ill., 179, 137 N.E., 793; Independent Oil Men's Ali·
sociation v. Fort Dearborn National Bank, 311, Ill.
278, 142 N.E. 458 ... " (e.a.)

1

The position of the authorities, heretofore cited,
to the effect that the cashing of a check with a miss· i
ing endorsement is a more serious violation of the
duty of a cashing bank than the cashing of a check
with a forged endorsement, justifies a brief reference to the almost universally established rules in
relation to forged endorsements.
In 9 C.J.S. Banks & Banking, Section 357 at p.
763 it is stated:
"Where a collecting bank cashes a check on a forged
endorsement, . . . the bank in collecting the check
holds the proceeds for the payee, ... permitting the
payee to maintain an action against such bank for
the amount of the check...•" ( e.a.)

Also in 10 Am. Jur, 2nd, Banks, Section 632, pages
599-600, it is stated:

"Although there are a few scattered cases to the
contrary, the general rule established by nearly all
courts is that a bank or other corporation which,
or an individual who, has obtained possession of a
check upon an unauthorized or forged endorsement
of the payee's signature, and has collected the amount
of the check from the drawee, is liable for the pro·
ceeds thereof to the payee or other owner, notwith·
standing they have been paid to the person from ;
whom the check was obtained, and notwithstanding
that the payee's signature was forged by his em·
ployee or agent."
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In line with the above the following cases interpreting statutes identical to the Utah statutes
above quoted have held the cashing banks liable
to joint payees where their endorsement was forged.
Federal Insurance Company vs Toiyabe Supply
Company, 409 P2d, 623 (Nev. 1966); Elwert vs Pacific
First Federal Savings and Lo·an Association. 138 Fed.
Supp. 395 (1956). The latter case was a circumstance
where the husband forged his wife's signature on
a check payable jointly to husband and wife. For
other cases reaching the same result see: Wagner
Trading Co. vs Battery Park National Bank. 228 N.Y.
37, 126 N.E. 347. 9 A.LR. 340 (1920); Greshams State
Bank vs Owen K. Construction Company. 370 P. 2d
726, 231 Ore. 106, (1962); House-Evans Company vs
Matoon Transfer and Storage Company, 275 P. 2d
268, Okla. (1954); Trails Moto.rs. Inc. vs First National
Bank of Laramie. 301 P. 2nd 775, 76 Wyo. 152 (1956);
Virginia-Carolina Joint Stock Land Bank vs First &
Citizens National Bank. 150 S.E. 34, 197 N.C. 526
0929): Hillsley vs State Bank of Albany. 263 N.Y.S.
2nd 578, 24 App. Div. 2nd 28, (1965); Kaufman vs
State Savings Bank. 114, N.W. 863 (Mich. 1908);
Crane vs Mercantile Trust and Savings Bank. 295
Ill., 375, 129 N.E. 120, 12 A.L.R 92.
In view of the above authorities there can be
little doubt but that the defendant, Tracy-Collins
Bank and Trust Company is liable to the plainitff
for its losses resulting from the wrongful cashing
and processing of the check drawn by Mayne
Plumbing and Heating and payable to Olympus
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Heating and Air Conditioning and Pacific Meta'.s
Company, jointly.
The Utah case of Mullner vs McCormic and Co.,
Bankers 69 Utah 557, 257 Pac. 658 (1927), states:
"The law is settled that-'the measure of damagPs
for the conversion promissory notes, bonds and
other evidence of indebtedness is their actual
value not their face value. But in the absence of
proof of the actual value, they will be deemed to be
worth their face value, or such sums as plaintiff
might have recovered on them'."

See also, Hillsley vs State Bank of Albany, supra at
page 17; Elwert vs First Federal Savings and Loan
Association of Tacoma, Washington, supra at page
17; and Acme Paper Company vs Goffstein, 270
P.2d 505; 125 Cal. App. 2d 175. In the case now before the court Pacific Metals was entitled to the full
face amount of the check as between Pacific Metals
and Olympus, consequently, Pacific Metals would
be entitled to recover that amount.
POINT IV
THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER
FROM BANK OF SALT LAKE THE FULL
AMOUNT OF THE PROCEEDS FROM THE
CHECK IN QUESTION.

The arguments heretofore made relating to liability of Tracy-Collins have equal application as
against the Bank of Salt Lake. There is, however, '
an additional ground on which Bank of Salt Lake is
liable to Pacific Metals. Mavne had on deposit with
Bank of Salt Lake sufficient -monies to pay the check

19
in question. It issued a check which was in form,
an instruction to the Bank of Salt Lake to pay to

Olympus and Pacific Metals the face amount of the
check. The "Prior Endorsement Guaranteed" stamp
of Tracy-Collins did not relieve the Bank of Salt
Lake of its duty to pay only in compliance with that
order. When the Bank of Salt Lake actually paid the
check in violation of tha.t Order they did so in viola.lion of their contractual relationship with Mayne,
their depositor and to the damage of the third-party
beneficiary of that contract, Pacific Metals.
Since the Bank of Salt Lake was serving as
Mayne's agent in the transaction and did not corr.ply with its duty to make payment only on proper
endorsement, Mayne in fact has not met its obligation on the agreement with Pacific Metals and
would be liable to them. It is not necessary, however, for Pacific Metals to sue Mayne and for Mayne
to sue the Bank of Salt Lake. This can be done in
one simplified action under the theory of a thirdparty beneficiary contract.
In the early case of Utah National Bank of Salt
Lake City v. Nelson, 38 Utah 169, 111 Pac. 907 (1910),
this court applied the third-party beneficiary theory
to a promissory note. The court stated at page 913:
"A consideration to a third-party may be an inducement to a person to give his note, and in such case
the promise is just as binding as though the promissor had received the benefit."
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The court stated further at page 914:
"Where a promise or contract has been made between two parties for the benefit of a third, an action
will lie thereon at the instance and in the name oi
the party to be benefited, although the promise or
contract was made without his knowledge and without any consideration moving from him."

In a more recent case this Court applied the
third-party beneficiary theory to the relationship
between a depositor and drawee bank and the
liability thereby incurred to the beneficiary of their
agreement. In Walker Bank and Trust Company v
First Security Corporation, 9 Utah 2d 215, 341 P.2d
944 (1959), the defendant, drawee bank, argued
there was no privity of contract between itself and
plaintiff, because plaintiff was not a party to the
contract and only indirectly a beneficiary thereo!.
The case involved a sight draft authorization re·
questing and authorizing the bank to charge to the
depositor's account sight drafts to be drawn by the
insurance company for monthly premiums on an
insurance policy. This court held the bank liable
to the Beneficiary under the insurance policy for the
full face value of the policy stating at page 945:
"It is often stated that privity of contract is a prerequisite to holding one liable for breach of duty
thereunder. But it is also recognized that there are
duties to others than the immediate parties, where
from the nature of the contract, it is plainly evident
to the promissor that the contract is for the benefit
of third persons and that a failure to discharge his
duty would adversly affect them."
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"In considering the Bank's duties to the beneficiaries
it is appropriate to look to the foundations of that
relationship. Between the bank and depositor it is
that of debtor-creditor to the extent of the customer's balance and it is the bank's duty to pay up to
that amount to anyone on the depositor's order and
in conformity with his direction, and this is also
usually true even where the depositor authorizes
another to draw on his account. ... " (e.a.)

The court stated further at page 946:
"Having accepted the responsibility, the duty to
fulfill it ran both to the depositor and to her beneficiaries for whom she maintained the policy and the
bank was obliged to evercise due care in performing
that duty at least until it notified the insured to the
contrary. Its failure to do so renders it liable to the
beneficiaries who are harmed thereby despite lack
of privity between them." (e.a.)

In footnote 3 of the Walker Bank case just referred to this Court summarized the authorities
which discuss the payee's duty to pay in conformity
to the depositor's direction and cited with approval
the case of American National Bank of Denver vs
First National Bank of Denver. Supra at page 12.
That case is very much in point and should be controlling on the issue of Bank of Salt Lake's liability.
In that case the Colorado Supreme Court stated
954:

at page

"The drawee bank is authorized to pay out funds belonging to its depositor when. and only when, the
check is endorsed by the payees therein, or by persons who have satisfied it or the bank to which the
check is presented for payment of their right to the

22
proceeds. We believe it to be the duty of the ban!:
upon which a check is drmvn to satisfy itself that it
is correctly endorsed; ... "

The drawee bank has a "duty to the drawer to investigate the endorsement on the check in order
that it may determine whether there is a full compliance with the written order of the drawer by a1
endorsement, even though not genuine." The court
went on to state the liability of the drawee bank as
follows:
"The drawer of the check, by his designation of the
payees therein, in effect issued a definite order to the
drawee bank and all others to whom the check might
be presented for payment that it was to be paid only
in accordance with his order to the payees therein
named. When Herford, [the cashing bank] endorsed
the check, 'Prior Endorsements Guaranteed,' the
banks through which the check passed may have
chosen to honor and pay the check, relying solely
on Herford's guaranty, but this, in no wise, relieved
the drawee bank of honoring the check only upon the
endorsement of the payees therein named. The
drawee bank simply, by cashing the check and charg·
ing the same to the drawer's account, indicated a
willingness to disregard and neglect its duty to the
depositor upon the guaranty of a responsible bank
that the duty of examining the check for endorsement of the payees had been performed by it." (e.a.I

Thus, from the authorities it is not the check
which is in and of itseH the contract, but the depositor relationship with the bank by which the
bank agrees to pay only the parties designated by
the depositor. The fact that the depositor could stop
payment on the check or an intervening garnish-
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ment might dissipate the funds, as happened in the
recent case of State Bank of Southern Utah v. Stallings. 427 P.2d 744, 19 Utah 2d 146, (1967), would not
relieve the bank of its duty in a case where the banK
undertook to pay the check and did so improperly.
It is, therefore, clear that the Bank of Salt Lake
as well as Tracy-Collins Bank and Trust Company
is liable to the plaintiff for losses resulting from the
violation of its duties to the intended beneficiaries
of its depositor.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the record in this case and upon
the authorities herein cited, Respondent and CrossAppellant, Pacific Metals Company, Division of A. M.
Castle and Company, respectfully prays that this
court affirm the Summary Judgment entered in the
court below against Tracy-Collins Bank and Trust
Company and set aside and vacate the court's order
below granting Judgment to Bank of Salt Lake
against Pacific Metals Company Division of A. M.
Castle and Company and denying said Respondent
and Cross-Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment against the Bank of Salt Lake.
Respectfully Submitted,
E. EARL GREENWOOD, JR.

JAY A. MESERVY
Attorneys for Respondent
and Cross-Appellant

